Speciesism is an ideology that justifies and supports the exploitation and discrimination of non-human animals on the basis of their membership of a particular animal species, i.e. on the basis of an arbitrary biological criterion whose intrinsic characteristics cannot justify the moral discrimination it postulates.
It is expressed on two levels:
In the name of these differences in status, speciesists allow themselves to treat animal species differently, even though they have the same cognitive potential, the same physiological needs and the same capacity to feel pain and pleasure.
The word speciesism was coined in 1970 by British psychologist Richard Ryder, but it was Australian philosopher Peter Singer who popularised it in his 1975 bestseller Animal Liberation, a book that has become a reference for anyone thinking about the moral and legal status of animals. Singer wrote that speciesism is ‘a prejudice or attitude in favour of the interests of members of one’s own species and against the interests of members of other species’.
Anti-speciesism is an ideology rooted in moral philosophy, formalised in the 1970s by Anglo-Saxon philosophers who believed that the species to which an animal belongs is not a relevant moral criterion:
Anti-speciesism is therefore a school of thought that necessarily translates into a dual perspective: legal and political.
In its legal dimension, anti-speciesism campaigns for the attribution of non-human legal personality to all sentient non-human animals and for the positive rights that necessarily follow from this.
In its political dimension, anti-speciesism calls for an end to animal exploitation and respect for and protection of the essential rights granted to sentient non-human animals. It therefore calls for the dismantling of the social structures that underpin speciesism, as well as the consideration of the interests and rights of other animals by our institutions.
It should be noted that anti-speciesism has been defined by Aymeric Caron as a ‘new humanism’: “The compassion I feel for all animals is proportional to the compassion I feel for the human species. I am an anti-speciesist. That is to say, I believe that there is no justification for discriminating against a being because of the species to which it belongs. Let’s make this clear from the outset: anti-speciesism is not just a cry in defence of mistreated animals. It is a social struggle for equality, which has the particularity of going beyond the simple case of humans. Anti-speciesism is therefore in reality a new humanism, which recognises our kinship with other animal species and draws the necessary conclusions.
Currently, numerous national and international legal provisions define other animals as ‘sentient beings that have needs specific to their nature’.
However, in their legal relations with the outside world, non-human animals are unfortunately still considered, by these same legislative provisions, as ‘tangible movable property or things’, expressions that are synonymous.
Roman law, which is the basis of Napoleonic law and most Western civil codes, is based on an essential distinction between persons and things. This ‘summa divisio’ is in turn subdivided into two entities. Things, or movable property, are divided into movable and immovable property. Persons, on the other hand, can be natural persons or legal persons (non-profit organisations, companies).
The results of scientific research, experiments and studies, particularly in ethology and neurology, have shown with certainty that the vast majority of non-human animals are sentient beings,
i.e. that in addition to being sensitive, other animals are capable of perceiving their existence subjectively as autonomous and individual subjects. They are aware of themselves and their environment.
They are and perceive themselves as ‘subjects of a life’ with desires, priorities, pleasures, fears, pains, anxieties, constraints, plans and a family.
In short, they are all individuals, insofar as they are sentient, who perceive themselves as individual entities, autonomous and independent of the environment that shelters them.
However, despite these undeniable conclusions, the vast majority of non-human animals are still treated in their economic and legal relations with the world as movable property. As such, they can be the object of private ownership and considered as commodities. Finally, it should be noted that wild animals that are not in anyone’s care or have not been appropriated are generally considered ‘res nullius’, i.e. things that belong to no one and are therefore not subject to any protection except that granted on an exceptional basis to certain species, at certain times, or in certain circumstances.
Legal personality is a principle by virtue of which a person is able to acquire rights and enter into obligations. The person is subject to rights. All natural persons have such prerogatives, even if this capacity can be variable and subject to adjustment, particularly when the person is incapacitated.
Our Western civil law also offers legal personality to persons who are not natural persons but who are what the law calls « legal persons ». These are groups, commercial companies or non-profit organisations, which can, like natural persons, become holders of rights and obligations. Thus, the legislator authorises structures devoid of any physical reality to access this status of legal personality through a simple fiction.
The attribution of legal personality is therefore the indispensable key to the granting of essential rights. It can even be said that in the absence of legal personality, a living being does not exist as a subject of rights. It is therefore only an object of law.
Thus, the legal attribution of a legal personality has several essential consequences:
Taking into account the conclusions of neurological and ethological research attesting to the sentience of the vast majority of non-human animals, anti-speciesism in its political dimension calls for the attribution of non-human legal personality to non-human animals, which will notably entail essential rights conferred on other animals and therefore the end of the exploitation of sentient lives.
This specific legal personality is already recognised for non-human animals in certain circumstances in many countries:
In its abolitionist dimension, anti-speciesism believes that the direction to take is that of extending the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to all sentient beings. In 1948, this text defined the fundamental rights that should apply to every human being on earth. It should be remembered that human beings are animals, a specific species of animal belonging to the primate category, like chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans and gorillas, which are their ancestors.
Three articles are therefore directly transposable and applicable to sentient non-human animals:
Therefore, six fundamental rights appear to be legitimately due to most sentient non-human animals:
These rights are therefore exclusively extra-patrimonial and aim above all to:
Furthermore, anti-speciesism seeks the dismantling of the systemic social structures underlying speciesism:
This means rethinking society and our laws, taking into account the fact that humans are not the only beings living in the world.
Making society inclusive for as many individuals as possible.
However, given the practical difficulties of imposing consistent abolitionism, we should mention the existence of the utilitarian school of thought.
According to its proponents, this would involve organising protection for animals in principle, while allowing infringements of this protection whenever justified by what is deemed to be a higher human interest, in the search for a fair compromise between the legitimate needs of humans and the protection of animals. Thus, whenever a substitute becomes available, the infringement can no longer be considered legitimate.
What human needs would ultimately still be considered sufficiently legitimate to justify harming animals? The criterion of the necessity of using a sentient living being should logically be considered as that of a vital necessity, a direct or indirect threat to the existence, life or health of humans, and regarded as a response to a serious danger threatening a person or an animal.
The use of animals would thus only be justified if it constitutes the only means of preserving humans from death or significant harm. From this perspective, the use of animals for fashion should be immediately prohibited, just as the necessity for humans to maintain a meat-based diet, as well as the use and exploitation of animals in areas as unnecessary as entertainment and clothing, would quickly be called into question. In the field of medical research and animal experimentation, massive investment should also be made to develop alternatives to animals and immediately exclude them from any experimentation that does not concern vital needs (cosmetics, etc.).